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EU FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: LITIGATING TO INCITE OPENNESS OF EU NEGOTIATIONS 
Case C-350/12 P Council of the European Union v Sophie in ’t Veld Judgment of the Court (First 
Chamber) of 3 July 2014 




Dutch Member of the European Parliament Sophie IŶ͛t ǀeld has served as vice-chair of the European 
Parliament committee for civil liberties, justice and home affairs and has been a high profile 
advocate of transparency in transatlantic relations. In addition to her parliamentary work, she has 
pursued some of these matters in court, both in the US and in the EU, and also has taken some cases 
before the European Ombudsman.1 A recent decision of the Court of Justice arising from litigation of 
in͛t Veld, supported exceptionally by the European Parliament, as to an EU-US data transfer 
agreement has arguably much significance for transparency and EU foreign relations and raises 
questions as to its broader implications for inter-institutional relations.  
 
As is well-known, the EU-US TFTP or SWIFT Agreement2 arose out of a scandal where the New York 
Times Newspaper published details disclosing secret access obtained by the US to the Belgian-based 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). The US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) was revealed to be running a secret program, procuring financial messaging data, in 
order to track terrorist financing.3 The EU-US TFTP Agreement was ultimately entered into so as to 
legitimise the US program in 2009.4 It was vetoed by the European Parliament in 2010, again 
exercising its powers of approval accorded by the Treaty of Lisbon, pursuant to Article 218 TFEU.5 A 
second SWIFT agreement was reached in 2010 and entered into force also in 2010. The legal basis of 
that Agreement is in Articles 87(2)(a) and 88(2) TFEU,6 the former providing for competence in police 
cooperation in the area of the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant 
information and the latter, to regulate the tasks and operation of Europol. Also, the new provision of 
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1 See IŶ ’t ǀeld ǀ. DepartŵeŶt of HoŵelaŶd Security Case No 1:08-cv-0115-RMC, District Judge Collyer presiding 
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US ƌelatioŶs afteƌ the SWIFT AgƌeeŵeŶt͛ ϭ7;ϱͿ European Foreign Affairs Review (2012), 71.  




the Treaty of Lisbon protecting the privacy of the personal data of EU citizens, Article 16 TFEU, is 
explicitly invoked in a recital to the Agreement.78  
 
IŶ ϮϬϬ9, iŶ͛t Veld sought aĐĐess uŶdeƌ ‘egulatioŶ No 1049/2001,9 to document 11897/09 of 9 July 
2009, containing an OpiŶioŶ of the CouŶĐil͛s Legal SeƌǀiĐe. The Opinion suggested that the earlier 
legal basis of the SWIFT Agreement was flawed.10 The Council refused accessed, on the basis that 
access would undermine the protection of legal advice intended only for the members of the Council 
discussing a proposed agreement and that its secrecy outweighed the public interest in disclosure. 
This deĐisioŶ iŶt͛ Veld sought to ĐhalleŶge in See T-529/09, IŶ’t Veld ǀ. CouŶĐil.  
 
 
Thus in 2012, the General Court annulled in part the decision of the Council of 29 October 2009 
refusing full access to the legal advices. The General Court found that that Regulation No 1049/2001 
was intended to confer on the public as wide a right of access as possible to documents of the 
institutions and that the mere fact that a document concerns an interest protected by an exception 
thereto did not justify the application of that provision.11 It held that the choice of the appropriate 
legal basis had constitutional significance and that any divergence of opinions on that subject could 
not be equated with a difference of opinion between the institutions. The Court had held that the 
mere fear of disclosing a disagreement within the institutions regarding the legal basis of a decision 
authorising the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union was an insufficient basis for 
concluding that the protected public interest in the field of international relations might be 
undermined. The General Court had limited its examination of the second plea, to the undisclosed 
parts of document 11897/09 only, and excluded those dealing with the specific content of the 
proposed agreement or the negotiating directives. Rather, the argument that the Council and its 
Legal Service could be deterred from asking for and providing written opinions relating to sensitive 
issues if those opinions subsequently had to be disclosed, were not substantiated by any specific, 
detailed evidence giving rise to a reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical threat to the 




On appeal to the Court of Justice, the Council claimed that the General Court infringed two 
provisions of Regulation No 1049/2001 restricting the right of access to documents of the 
institutions pursuant to the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, relating to the 
protection of the public interest as regards international relations, and the second indent of 
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Article 4(2) of the regulation, providing for an exception in respect of legal advice.  The Council 
aƌgued that the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s ŶegotiatiŶg paƌtŶeƌs Đould eǆploit the diffeƌeŶĐes of opiŶioŶ 
between the institutions to the European UnioŶ͛s disadǀaŶtage and have an adverse impact on the 
EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s ĐƌediďilitǇ aŶd effeĐtiǀeŶess iŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ŶegotiatioŶs.12 Rather, in this context 
they had a wide margin of discretion which operated to limit the form of judicial review taking place 




Findings of the Advocate General 
Advocate General Sharpston ruled in favour of iŶ͛t ǀeld on 12 February 2014 in a much more forceful 
vindication of transparency in the negotiation of international agreements by the EU.13 She held that 
the Regulation was silent on the particular standard of review pertaining to legal advice dealing with 
the EU͛s iŶteƌŶatioŶal ƌelatioŶs. SiŵilaƌlǇ, it ǁas sileŶt oŶ the Ŷature of the public interest in 
disclosure of such advices. She argued for a broader application of existing access to documents 
caselaw. IŶ a ĐƌitiĐal passage, the AdǀoĐate GeŶeƌal posed the ƋuestioŶ as to ǁhetheƌ ͚… the thƌee-
stage Turco test14 apply to a request for disclosure of a document containing legal advice concerning 
oŶgoiŶg iŶteƌŶatioŶal ƌelatioŶs? …  My view is that it should.  It is true that the Court stated in Turco 
that the thƌee stages that it had ideŶtified ǁeƌe of ͚paƌtiĐulaƌ ƌeleǀaŶĐe͛ ǁhere the Council acts in a 
legislative capacity. However, the three stages themselves are framed in terms that are of general 
appliĐatioŶ, thus Ŷot eǆĐludiŶg the possiďilitǇ that theǇ ŵaǇ applǇ to otheƌ iŶstitutioŶal aĐtiǀities.͛15  
 
 
Decision of the Court of Justice 
 
In July 2014, the Court of Justice upheld the reasoning of the General Court rejecting assertions that 
the existence of a legal debate as to the extent of the powers of the institutions with regard to the 
international activity of the European Union might give rise to a presumption of the existence of a 
threat to the credibility of the European Union in the negotiations for an international agreement.16 
Just as the General Court had found that the Council had not demonstrated how disclosure of 
document would cause risk and undermine its interests, the Court of Justice did not find itself 
persuaded to the contrary.17  The Court of Justice held that while the requirements for transparency 
are greater where the Council is acting in its legislative capacity, initiating and conducting 
negotiations in order to conclude an international agreement fell in principle within the domain of 
the executive. The General Court also held that the application of the principle of the transparency 
                                                          
12 See para. 31. 
13 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, delivered on 13 February 2014.  
14 Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I-ϰ7Ϯϯ ;͚Turco͛Ϳ. 
15 Para. 69-71. 
16 Case C-350/12 P, CouŶĐil of the EuropeaŶ UŶioŶ ǀ Sophie iŶ ’t Veld Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 
3 July 2014. 




of the decision-making process of the European Union could not be ruled out in international affairs, 
a conclusion which the Court of Justice also concurred with. 
 
The Court held that the Council was really seeking to justify the application of a single ground for 
refusal by invoking two different exceptions set out in Article 4. The Council had argued that the 
European Parliament would seek to use the information contained in the legal opinion in order to 
iŶflueŶĐe the oŶgoiŶg ŶegotiatioŶs aŶd to ĐhalleŶge the legalitǇ of the CouŶĐil͛s deĐisioŶ oŶ the 
conclusion of the proposed agreement.18 However, the Court held that that that criticism overlooked 
the fact that the General Court decided that the Council was justified in refusing access to the 
specific content of the proposed agreement and the strategic objectives of the EU but that the 
Council did not provide any evidence to establish how the disclosure of the remainder of that 
document would have given rise to risk. In Commission v Council19 the Court had previously held that 
certain conduct could jeopardise the successful outcome of negotiations but the Court here found 
that this was not the case. While the Council further submitted that the General Court should have 
confined itself to a limited review, the Court of Justice held that the General Court had confined 
itself to reviewing the statement of reasons underpinning the decision at issue and did not, 






In’t veld ostensibly has a narrow remit, pertaining mainly to specific disclosures between institutions 
and legal advice. Arguably, however, it feeds into a significant and broader debate which relates to 
carving out, (1) the right of the European Parliament to information in international relations (even if 
the specific case relates to individual rights) and (2) denting secrecy in EU international relations 
negotiations. 
 
As to the first point, the EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s new right of veto on international agreements in 
Article 218 TFEU is specifically linked to a right of information in Article 218 (10) TFEU.20 The recent 
͚ACTA͛ affair has rendered salient what Article 218 TFEU mandates as regards transparency in the 
conduct of EU international relations,21 which prompted the European Commission to take measures 
to dispel ͚ŵǇths͛ aŶd puďlish iŶfoƌŵatioŶ Đatalogues about a controversial international agreement. 
However, this was occurred after significant inter-institutional conflict between the European 
Commission and European Parliament, at political and judicial level. Notably, the agreement was 
                                                          
18 Para 109. 
19 Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263.  
20 Council Regulation (EC) 1049/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).  
21 See Council Decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) between the 
European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican 
States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the 
United States of America, No. 12195/11,  23 August 2011. It was negotiated and signed by the EU and was 




voted down by MEPs because of a lack of information.22 IŶ͛t Veld again herself sought public access 
to the negotiating mandate for ACTA through litigation. The document was subsequently leaked and 
then was placed by the EU in the public domain. The General Court recently ruled against her on the 
ground that the interest in shielding the EU͛s ŶegotiatioŶ strategy had to prevail, a position that 
transparency advocates have vigorously opposed.23  
 
As to the second point, beyond ACTA, one high profile set of negotiations that the decision in In’t 
Veld has relevance for are the EU and US negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Agreement (TTIP), the trade agreement under negotiation between the EU and US to cut trade 
ďaƌƌieƌs aŶd ͚ďehiŶd the ďoƌdeƌs͛ ďaƌƌieƌs ;teĐhŶiĐal ƌegulatioŶs, staŶdaƌds, appƌoǀalsͿ iŶ a ǁide 
variety of sectors.24  The TTIP negotiations have been ostensibly very open as a process. There is an 
active EU TTIP twitter account (@EU_TTIP), RSS feeds, video-streamed meetings, broad public 
consultations and prolific document dissemination. However, the TTIP negotiation mandate and 
draft text was leaked early into the negotiations alongside the official channels of information, in 
dedicated leaking forums.25 The Ombudsman late into the TTIP negotiations recently raised 
questions as to the true place of openness in the negotiations and launched a public consultation.26  
Only in October 2014 did the Member States of the EU finally agreed to the release of the EU 
negotiation mandate for TTIP, notably after the In’t veld decision.27  
  
There is a perceived shift in the openness of the CJEU to international relations and exceptions to EU 
openness rules on access to documents. For example, in 2013, the General Court in Besselink v. 
Council required the Council to reconsider its partial disclosure of the negotiation mandate for EU 
accession to the ECHR, after a national parliament had published it in part.28 This shift is not going 
unnoticed in the Member States parliaments.29 In the broader scheme of things, the Court itself is 
                                                          
22 Christina Eckes, Elaine Fahey and Machiko KaŶetake, ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal, EuƌopeaŶ aŶd US PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ the 
Negotiation and Adoption of the Anti-CouŶteƌfeitiŶg Tƌade AgƌeeŵeŶt ;ACTAͿ͛, Currents, XX(2), (2012)  20.  
See European Commission, 10 Myths about ACTA, 1, 1-3 (2012), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/january/tradoc_148964.pdf. Cf Bart Driessen, Transparency in EU 
IŶstitutioŶal Laǁ: A praĐtitioŶer’s haŶdďook, (2nd ed., Kluwer Law, 2012). 
23 T-301/10, IŶ’t ǀeld ǀ. EuropeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ,  decision of the General Court of 19 March 2013, [2013] ECR II-
000, appeal pending. See also its confirmation in part by the General Court in Case C-331/11 Besselink v. 
Council [2013] ECR I-000 (Council decision authorising ECHR accession negotiations), paras. 70, 72. Cf Marija 
Bartl and Elaine FaheǇ, ͚A Post NatioŶal ŵaƌketplaĐe? NegotiatiŶg the TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ Tƌade aŶd IŶǀestŵeŶt 
Partnership in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on 
the Relationship between the EU and US legal orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); I.e.that 
the ŵeƌe ͚listiŶg͛ of EU iŶteƌests iŶ a ŶegotiatioŶ ŵaŶdate foƌ aŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal agƌeeŵeŶt is not in any sense a 
strategy: Deirdre CuƌtiŶ, ͚OffiĐial SeĐƌets aŶd the Negotiation of International Agreements: is the EU Executive 
UŶďouŶd?͛, ϱϬ Common Market Law Review, (2013) 423. 
24 Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/> (last accessed 3 November 2014).  
25 Available at <http://eu-secretdeals.info/ttip/> (last accessed 3 November 2014). 
26 Available at <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/correspondence.faces/en/56100/html.bookmark> 
(last accessed 3 November 2014).  
27 E.g. The EU-Canada free trade agreement (CETA) was leaked in August 2014 by the German broadcaster 
ARD. 
28 See T-331/11, Besselink v Council of Europe [2013] ECR II-000, (12 September 2013) 
29 See House of Lords European Scrutiny Committee (8 January 2014) -  Contents  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-xxvi/8317.htm  
͚… it is also apparent that the EU courts are now more open to partial disclosure of institutional 




coming under more scrutiny for its transparency practices.30 The Court of Justice has in Int Veld 
delivered a victory in her favour weighing in against blanket institutional secrecy in the area of 
international relations. Its context is a significant one, of a push for openness in negotiations during 
a period of significant EU activity as a global actor. How far this decision will reverberate remains to 
be seen.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Government to the recent judgment in the case of [See T-331/11] Besselink v Council of Europe (12 
September 2013)… where the General Court required the Council to reconsider partially disclosing the 
accession negotiating mandate (pursuant to Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001) in accordance 
with the proportionality principle.͛͛  
30 Alemanno, Alberto and Stefan, Oana ͚Openness at the Court of Justice of the European Union: Toppling a 
Taboo͛,  51(1)Common Market Law Review, (2014), 97. 
